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Abstract--In this paper, we address the problem of service avail- 
ability in mobile ad-hoc WANs. We present a secure mechanism to 
stimulate end users to keep their devices turned on, to refrain from 
overloading the network, and to thwart tampering aimed at convert- 
ing the device into a '~sellish" one. Our solution is based on the ap- 
plication of a tamper resistant security module in each device and 
cryptographic protection of messages. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The context 
The Terminodes Project [1], [2] is a 10-year esearch 
program (2000-2010) with the aim to investigate wide area, 
large, totally wireless, mobile networks that we call mo- 
bile ad-hoc wide area networks. In this project, we fol- 
low a radically distributed approach, in which all network- 
ing functions are embedded in the terminals themselves. 
Because they act as network nodes and terminals at the 
same time, we call these devices terminodes. A network 
of terminodes i an autonomous, elf-organized network, 
completely independent of any fixed infrastructure orother 
equipment. 
Our vision of the Terminodes Project can be illustrated 
by a free, amateur, wireless ad-hoc network covering a 
wide area, which operates at unlicensed frequencies. In 
this scenario, terminodes are small personal devices that 
everyone in the area could potentially own. The size of 
the network can reach several million devices in regions of 
high density population. Communication among users is 
based on packet switched 1, multi-hop, wireless communi- 
cation of voice and data. An important characteristic of ter- 
minode networks is that there are no routing tables stored 
in the devices. Instead, a simple packet forwarding mech- 
anism lets each of the terminodes located on the route of a 
given packet compute the "best" next hop toward the final 
destination [3]. 
1 While circuit switching isan advantage forsupporting voice, the com- 
plexity associated with establishing, maintaining, and releasing circuits, 
or any form of connection, is at odds with the requirement that interme- 
diate systems are user equipment, and may operate quite irregularly. 
B. The problem 
The problem that we address in this paper is the avail- 
ability of services in terminode networks. In civilian appli- 
cations of ad-hoc networks, which we are exclusively con- 
cerned with in the Terminodes Project, availability is often 
considered to be the security issue of greatest relevance for 
users [4]. We concentrate on two aspects of availability in 
terminode networks: 
• St imulat ion  fo r  co -operat ion .  Since all networking 
services (e.g., packet forwarding, mobility management) 
should be provided by the terminodes themselves, these 
services are available only if the terminodes (or, more pre- 
cisely, their users) are willing to provide them. On the 
other hand, service provision is not in the direct interest of 
users, because it consumes energy and thus, reduces bat- 
tery lifetime. Therefore, a stimulation mechanism that en- 
courages users to leave their terminodes switched on and 
let them provide services to other terminodes i required. 
One can say that being able to receive messages i enough 
motivation for the user to leave her terminode switched on. 
While this may indeed be true, it is certainly not enough 
to encourage users to provide services to other terminodes. 
The hardware and the software of the terminode can be 
tampered with and their behavior can be modified by the 
user in a way that the device can receive messages but it 
does not provide any services to the community. Further- 
more, criminal organizations can tamper with terminodes 
and sell corrupted evices, which do not co-operate in or- 
der to save energy, on a large scale. 
So far, civilian applications of ad-hoc networks have been 
envisioned mainly in crisis situations (e.g., rescue opera- 
tions). For this reason, it was assumed that users are natu- 
rally motivated to co-operate. In terminode networks, this 
assumption does not hold, because of the size of the net- 
work, and because we consider that the network lifetime 
can be long (typically, several years). 
• Prevent ion  o f  over load ing .  Often, services are unavail- 
able because the network is overloaded and it can no longer 
carry useful information. The network can become over- 
loaded because of a malicious denial-of-service attack, or 
simply because some of the (otherwise legitimate) users 
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want to send too much information. Therefore, we need 
a mechanism that makes denial-of-service attacks "expen- 
sive" and discourages users from flooding the network with 
useless traffic. In cellular networks, this objective is auto- 
matically achieved by charging the users. 
C. The approach 
One possible approach to stimulate a co-operative be- 
havior and prevent congestion is to introduce the concept 
of money and service charges. The natural idea is that ter- 
minodes that used a service should be charged and termin- 
odes that provided a service should be remunerated. To 
this end, we introduce a terminode currency that we call 
nuggets. We assume that the terminode hardware comes 
with an initial stock of nuggets. The terminode nuggets 
have no monetary value, and they can only be used within 
terminode networks. 
Now, if a terminode wants to use a service (e.g., wants 
to send a message), then it has to pay for it in nuggets. 
This motivates each terminode to increase its number of 
nuggets, because nuggets are indispensable for using the 
network. Thus, the terminode is no longer interested in 
sending useless messages and overloading the network be- 
cause this would decrease itsnumber of nuggets, and it is 
better off providing services to other terminodes because 
this is the only way to earn nuggets 2.
D. Outline 
In the sequel, we focus on the rewarding of one of the 
most important services that the terminodes should provide 
to each other, namely, packet forwarding. In Section II, we 
introduce two approaches to solve this problem: the Packet 
Purse Model and the Packet Trade Model. The remaining 
sections are concerned with the implementation f these 
models. In Section HI, we summarize our general assump- 
tions. Then, we present implementations that enforce the 
models in Section IV. Finally, in Section V, We discuss 
the robustness and the efficiency of our solution, and, in 
Section VI, we conclude the paper. 
II. REWARDING THE PACKET FORWARDING SERVICE 
A. The Packet Purse Model (PPM) 
In this model, the originator of the packet pays for 
the packet forwarding service. The service charge is dis- 
2Similar to money in real life, nuggets can be lost as well. This loss 
has to be compensated somehow, otherwise the system g tspoorer and 
poorer. One way to solve this problem is to let users buy nuggets. Nuggets 
can be created by international treaty organizations and their agencies. 
This would mean that providing services is, actually, not the on  way o 
earn uggets. However, it can be made th  preferred way by appropriately 
choosing the price of one nugget. 
tributed among the forwarding terminodes in the follow- 
ing way: When sending the packet, the originator loads it 
with a number of nuggets ufficient o reach the destina- 
tion. Each forwarding terminode acquires one or several 
nuggets from the packet and thus, increases the stock of its 
nuggets; the number of nuggets depends on the direct con- 
nection on which the packet is forwarded (long distance 
requires more nuggets). If a packet does not have enough 
nuggets to be forwarded, then it is discarded. 
Packet forwarding in the Packet Purse Model is illus- 
trated in Figure 1. Let us assume that originally each ter- 
minode has 7 nuggets (1). Furthermore, let us assume that 
A wants to send a packet o D. In order to do so, A loads, 
say, 5 nuggets in the packet and sends it to the next hop/3 
(2). /3 takes out 1 nugget from the packet, and forwards 
it with the remaining 4 nuggets to C (3). C takes out 2 
nuggets from the packet and forwards it with the remaining 
2 nuggets to the final destination D (4). Note that termin- 
odes 13 and C, which forwarded the packet, increased their 
stock of nuggets, whereas terminode A, which originated 
the packet, decreased its stock of nuggets. 
The basic problem with this approach is that it might 
be difficult to estimate the number of nuggets that are re- 
quired to reach a given destination. If the originator under- 
estimates this number, then the packet will be discarded, 
and the originator loses its investment in this packet. If  the 
originator over-estimates the number (like in our example 
above), then the packet will arrive, but the originator still 
loses the remaining nuggets in the packet s. The model de- 
scribed in the next subsection overcomes this problem. 
B. The Packet Trade Model (PTM) 
In this approach, the packet does not carry nuggets, but 
it is traded for nuggets by intermediate rminodes. Each 
intermediary "buys" it from the previous one for some 
nuggets 4, and "sells" it to the next one (or to the desti- 
nation) for more nuggets. In this way, each intermediary 
that provided a service by forwarding the packet, increases 
its number of nuggets, and the total cost of forwarding the 
packet is covered by the destination of the packet. 
As an example, let us consider Figure 2. Let us assume 
that originally each terminode has 7 nuggets (1). Further- 
more, let us assume that A wants to send a packet o D. A 
sends the packet o the first hop B for free (2). B then sells 
it to the next hop C for 1 nugget (3). Finally, C sells it to 
3Although, if the destination of the packet is a terminode that provides 
information services, then the remaining nuggets can be used to pay for 
these. 
4Except for the first intermediary that receives the packet for free from 
the originator. 
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the final destination D for 2 nuggets (4). Note that terrain- 
odes B and C, which forwarded the packet, increased their 
number of nuggets, whereas the destination D decreased 
its number of nuggets. 
An advantage of this approach is that the originator does 
not have to know in advance the number of nuggets re- 
quired to deliver a packet. Furthermore, letting the desti- 
nation pay for the packet forwarding makes this approach 
applicable in case of multicast packets as well. 
A disadvantage is that this approach for charging does 
not directly deter users from flooding the network. How- 
ever, allowing each terminode to decide if it buys a packet 
or not can provide a sort of "back pressure" mechanism, 
which may deter a user from generating too much traffic, 
by ensuring that eventually nobody will buy packets from 
users who try to overload the network. 
C. Problems to be solved 
Clearly, the models described above must be enforced 
somehow, otherwise the terminodes may depart from them. 
Terminodes (users) may misbehave in several ways if no 
enforcement and no protection are applied. One important 
general problem is, for instance, to prevent ugget forgery. 
In addition, the problems that we have to cope with in 
the Packet Purse Model include the following: 
• The originator of a packet should be denied the re-use of 
the nuggets that it loaded in the packet purse. 
• A forwarding terminod~ should be denied taking more 
nuggets out of the packet than it deserves for the packe~ 
forwarding (i.e., "packet robbery" should be prevented). 
• Each intermediary should be forced to indeed forward 
the packet after having taken the nuggets out of it. 
• The integrity of the packet purse should be protected 
during transit. 
• The replay of a packet purse should be detected s. 
SConsider the following subtle replay attack. An intermediary receives 
• Detachment of a packet purse from its original packet 
and re-use of it with another packet should be impossible. 
Problems to be solved in the Packet Trade Model include 
the following: 
• Each terminode should be denied the re-use of the 
nuggets that it spent for buying packets. 
• A forwarding terminode should receive the nuggets from 
the next hop if, and only if, the next hop receives the packet 
from the forwarding terminode (fairness of the exchange). 
• An intermediary should be prevented from selling the 
same packet several times (possibly to different next hops). 
Furthermore, all the problems above should be solved 
in an efficient way; forwarding a single packet should not 
require complex cryptographic protocols and heavy com- 
putational effort, because the cost of these may well exceed 
the value of the service. We believe that we have found the 
best trade-off between robustness and efficiency in our im- 
plementations of the Packet Purse Model and the Packet 
Trade Model, which we present in the following sections. 
III. GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS 
In this section, we summarize our general assumptions, 
which our implementations of the models described above 
rely on. 
• Tamper resistant security module. We assume that 
each terminode has a tamper esistant security module, 
such as, for instance, a special chip or a smart card, that 
is used for the management of cryptographic parameters 
(e.g., keys) and nuggets. We assume that this security mod- 
ule functions correctly and its behavior cannot be modified 
by the user of the terminode or other attackers. Contrary to 
the security module, other parts of the terminode hardware 
a packet with a packet purse, it copies them and then, simulates the recep- 
tion of the same packet with the same packet purse several times (each 
time increasing its stock of nuggets) without forwarding the packet. If 
this kind of replay was not detected, then the intermediary can, actually, 
become arbitrarily rich from this single packet. 
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and software are not tamper esistant and their behavior 
can be modified by anybody who has physical access to 
the device. We understand that regular users usually do 
not have the required level of knowledge and skills to mod- 
ify their terminodes. Criminal organizations, however, can 
have enough interest and resources to reverse ngineer a
terminode and sell tampered terminodes with modified be- 
havior on a large scale. Users may be interested in buying 
these tampered evices if they offer advantages over cor- 
rectly behaving ones (e.g., longer battery lifetime). Our de- 
sign goal is to distribute the terminode functions between 
the tamper esistant security module and the rest of the ter- 
minode device, which can be altered by an attacker, in a 
way that modification of the latter cannot give any advan- 
tages to the attacker. 
• Publ ic  key infrastructure. We assume that there exists 
a public key infrastructure that the terminodes (or, more 
precisely, their security modules) can use to authenticate 
each other and to establish secure communication links. 
The design of an appropriate public key infrastructure for 
terminodes i an interesting and non-trivial problem that is 
beyond the scope of this paper. An approach to solve this 
problem is described in [5], other possible approaches are 
mentioned in [3]. 
• Slowly changing neighborhood. We assume that the 
neighborhood of a terminode does not change very fast. 
This makes it feasible for the terminode to keep track of 
its neighbors by running a sort of "hello protocol" at reg- 
ular time intervals. Besides discovering its neighbors, the 
security module of the terminode uses the hello protocol 
to establish shared secrets with the security modules of 
its neighbors (different secrets with different neighbors, of 
course). The establishment of the shared secret is based 
on public key cryptography and relies on the existing pub- 
lic key infrastructure. In addition to the shared secret, we 
require that the security module agrees on the initial val- 
ues of two counters with each of its neighbors. The shared 
secret and the two counters are used to protect he commu- 
nication between eighboring security modules and will be 
discussed further in Section IV. 
• Omnidirectional antennae. We assume that the ter- 
minodes use omnidirectional ntennae, which means that 
a message sent by a terminode can be heard by all the ter- 
minodes within the communication range of the sender. 
We further assume that such a message can not only be 
heard, but it is understood by all of the neighbors. By this, 
we mean that all the neighbors receive the message and 
can determine who the sender and the intended receiver 
are and what the content of the message is 6. Depending on 
the MAC layer used, this may require that the terminodes 
agree on further parameters with their neighbors during the 
hello protocol. If, for instance, access to the shared radio 
resource is based on code division (CDMA), then the ter- 
minode should inform its neighbors about all the codes that 
it uses, in order for the neighbors to be able to receive mes- 
sages ent by the terminode. 
• Symmetry of the neighbor relationship. For the sake 
of simplicity, we assume that the neighbor elationship is
symmetric, which means that if terminode A is a neighbor 
of terminode B, then terminode B is a neighbor of terrain- 
ode A as well. 
• Reliable communication between neighbors. Another 
simplifying assumption we made is that the communica- 
tion channel between eighboring terminodes i reliable. 
This means that if a message is sent successfully (e.g., 
without any collision), then it arrives to the intended next 
hop correctly. We will address the problem of unreliable 
communication links in a future paper. We note, however, 
that this assumption does not imply that end-to-end com- 
eMote precisely, each neighbor can see the bits of the message, al- 
though not necessarily understanding the real meaning of the message 
(e.g., in case of end-to-end encrypted messages). 
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munication is reliable. Since messages can be modified 
and intercepted by the forwarding terminodes themselves, 
successfully sending a message to the next hop does not 
mean that the message will correctly arrive to the final des- 
tination. 
• Pricing. In the Packet Purse Model, we assume that 
there exists a mechanism to estimate the number of nuggets 
that the originator of a packet must load in the packet purse 
in order for the packet o be delivered to the final destina- 
tion. Furthermore, we also assume that there is a mecha- 
nism to determine the number of nuggets that a forward- 
ing terminode can acquire from a packet purse. Similarly, 
in the Packet Trade Model, we assume that there exists a 
mechanism to determine the number of nuggets, for which 
a forwarding terminode can sell a packet o the next hop. 
In order to ease presentation, in this paper, we assume that 
each forwarding terminode should be rewarded with ex- 
actly one nugget for the packet forwarding. This means, 
that in the Packet Purse Model, each intermediate rmin- 
ode that forwards the packet can take exactly one nugget 
out of it, and in the Packet Trade Model, each forwarding 
intermediary can sell the packet for one more nugget han 
it paid for. Our solution, however, works without modifi- 
cations in the general case as well. 
• Terminodes are greedy. We assume that terminodes are 
greedy, and they always want to increase their number of 
nuggets. On one hand, this is reasonable, because nuggets 
are indispensable for using the network. On the other hand, 
there might be situations, where greediness i not the best 
strategy. Consider, for instance, a terminode that has a lot 
of nuggets, but whose battery is almost exhausted. In this 
situation, earning more nuggets has clearly less benefit, 
than saving battery power. But if the terminode is greedy, 
then it keeps on forwarding packets, and uses up all of its 
energy. It would be more realistic to assume that the be- 
havior of the terminode depends on both the number of its 
nuggets and the status of its battery. This issue is left for 
further study. 
• No network operator. We assume that the network is 
totally self-organized and self-operated. Users simply pur- 
chase and use terminodes, which come with an initial stock 
of nuggets. The inter-work)ng with existing fixed and wire- 
less networks is left for future study. 
IV. IMPLEMENTING THE MODELS 
We use the tamper esistant security module to enforce 
the behavior described by the models. In this section, we 
present the description of this module and the protocols 
that it runs with its environment. Our leading design prin- 
ciple is to put as little as possible in the security module in 
order to rely on as few assumptions as possible. 
A. Long and medium term data in the security module 
The security module stores and manipulates data that are 
critical for the correct behavior of the system. Since the 
security module is tamper esistant, these data cannot be 
corrupted by the user of the terminode or other attackers. 
The following long term data re stored in the security 
module SM: 
• Unique identifier. The security module stores its 
system-wide unique identifier, which we denote by idsM. 
• Private key. The security module has a public key and 
a corresponding private key. The private key is exclusively 
known to SM and, thus, it must be stored by SM.  The 
public key does not need to be kept secret, therefore, it can 
be stored elsewhere. It is important, however, that other 
security modules associate the right public key (i.e., the 
public key of SM)  with the unique identifier of SM.  This 
is ensured with the help of the assumed public key infras- 
tructure. 
• Number of nuggets. Nuggets are represented by coun- 
ters in the security modules of the terminodes. The wealth 
of each terminode is equal to the value of the nugget 
counter in its security module. We denote the nugget 
counter in the security module by nSM. 
In addition, the security module keeps a list of current 
neighbors and maintains data associated to each of these. 
SM stores the following medium term data for each neigh- 
boring security module SM':  
• Unique identifier. The system-wide unique identifier 
idsM, of the neighbor. 
• Shared secret key. When SM and SM'  become neigh- 
bors, they establish a shared secret key kSM,SM' between 
them using the hello protocol and public key cryptography. 
This shared secret is exclusively known to SM and SM' ,  
and it is used to protect he communication between them. 
This protection, in turn, is based on symmetric key cryp- 
tography for efficiency reasons. Protection is necessary, 
because the security modules cannot communicate directly 
but only through their hosting terminodes, which are under 
the control of (potentially malicious) users. 
• Sending and receiving counters. SM stores a send- 
ing counter eSM._~SM, and a receiving counter eSM+_SM, 
associated with SM' .  These counters are used to detect 
message replay, which, as mentioned in Subsection II- 
C, would fool the security module to process the same 
message twice. SM'  has similar counters CSM,~SM and 
eSM,+..SM, which are associated with SM.  When SM 
and SM'  become neighbors, they initialize their receiv- 
ing counters to random values and use the hello proto- 
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col to set their sending counters uch that the following 
holds: CSM...+S M, = CSM'~.--SM -}- 1 and CSM,.-+SM = 
CSM~--SM, q- 1. Then, each time SM sends a mes- 
sage to SM',  it includes the current value of its sending 
counter CSM_.+SM, in the message, and then increments 
the counter. When SM receives a message from SM ~, 
it verifies if the message contains a counter value that is 
greater than its current receiving counter CSM+-SM'. If  so, 
then it accepts the message and increases its counter to the 
received value, otherwise it rejects the message. SM'  be- 
haves imilarly. 
• Fine. Another counter is fSM,SM' ,  the initial value of 
which is 0. SM uses this counter to account for the mis- 
behavior of the terminode that hosts SM ~ with respect o 
the terminode that hosts SM.  The protocols that are used 
by the security modules are such that SM does not imme- 
diately increase its nugget counter if its hosting terminode 
forwarded a packet, but it waits for an acknowledgment 
from the security module SM'  of the next hop in order to 
be sure that the packet has indeed been forwarded. If this 
acknowledgement does not arrive, then SM records the 
misbehavior f the next hop by increasing the fine counter 
fSM,SM'  associated with SM'.  The next time it sends a 
packet o the same next hop, SM also sends the value of 
the fine counter. If this packet is processed by the next 
hop, then SM ~ takes into account he fine by decreasing 
its nugget counter accordingly, and SM can reset its fine 
counter. If, however, this packet is not processed either 
(i.e., no acknowledgement arrives), then SM further in- 
creases the fine counter. If the counter exceeds a limit, then 
the hosting terminode of SM may stop forwarding packets 
toward the misbehaving next hop. This mechanism stimu- 
lates terminodes to send acknowledgements. 
We should note that a missing acknowledgment does not 
necessarily mean that the next hop is misbehaving and did 
not send it. It is also possible that the hosting terminode 
of SM cheated and it did not actually forward.the packet 
or it falsely claims the acknowledgement to be missing. 
However, we assume that this is not the case, because it 
would contradict our assumption about the greediness of 
the terminode: the terminode cannot increase its number 
of nuggets by not forwarding the packet or claiming an 
arrived acknowledgement missing, whereas it can increase 
its number of nuggets if it behaves correctly. 
B. Implementing the Packet Purse Model 
B.1 The Packet Purse Header (PPH) 
In the Packet Purse Model, each packet has to carry 
some nuggets required to forward the packet. These 
nuggets are stored in the Packet Purse Header (PPH), 
which is an additional header between the MAC Layer 
Header and the Network Layer Header as it is illustrated 
in Figure 3. The PPH is created and manipulated by secu- 
rity modules. It is cryptographically protected in order to 
prevent forgery and illegitimate modification during tran- 
sit. 
The PPH is re-computed by the security module of each 
forwarding terminode. It has three parts: a part that is in- 
tended for the security module of the next hop, another 
part that is an acknowledgement for the security module of 
the previous hop, and a third one that is common and in- 
tended for both the next and the previous hops. The com- 
mon part contains only the unique identifier of the security 
module that computed this PPH. The acknowledgement 
part contains the identifier of the security module of the 
previous hop, the sending counter that was received from 
that hop, and an Acknowledgement Authentication Code 
(AAC) that is computed from the previous PPH, which was 
attached to he packet, using a keyed cryptographic hash 
function g, where the key is the shared secret between this 
security module and the security module of the previous 
hop. Finally, the purse part that is intended for the secu- 
rity module of the next hop contains the identifier of that 
security module, the sending counter associated with that 
security module, the number of nuggets in the packet, a.
fine to be paid by the next hop, and a Purse Authentication 
Code (PAC), which is computed from the purse part of the 
PPH and the cryptographic hash value h(NetworkPDU) 
of the content of the packet using a keyed cryptographic 
hash function g, where the key is the shared secret between 
this security module and the security module of the next 
hop. 
As it can be seen from the description, the acknowledge- 
ment that is intended for the previous hop is piggy backed 
on the packet hat is sent to the next hop. Here, we rely 
on the assumptions that the neighbor elationship is sym- 
metric and the terminodes have omnidirectional ntennae. 
Thus, when a terminode forwards a packet o the next hop, 
the previous hop, from which this packet has arrived, also 
receives it, and extracts the acknowledgement. 
B.2 The packet forwarding protocol 
The packet forwarding protocol is illustrated in Figure 4, 
where we assume that terminode Tq has received a packet 
from terminode Tp (which received it from the previous 
hop To), and Tq wants to forward it to Tr. To do so, Tq 
has to obtain a new Packet Purse Header PPH'  from its 
security module SMq by supplying it with the identifier 
of the security module of the next hop, the Packet Purse 
Header PPH received from the previous hop, and the 
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cryptographic hash value h(NetworkPDU) of the con- 
tent of the packet. 
SMq first verifies PPH. It reads the identifier of its 
sender SMp from the common part of PPH. Then, it 
verifies if the sending counter in PPH is greater than the 
receiving counter eq~p associated with SMp. If so, then 
this PPH is not a replay (i.e., it has not yet been pro- 
cessed by SMq), and SMq proceeds by setting eq~p to the 
received counter value. SMq then verifies the authenticity 
of PPH by re-computing the Purse Authentication Code 
and comparing the computed value to the received one. If 
they match, then it knows that PPH has indeed been cre- 
ated by SMp and has not been modified• Finally, it checks 
if there is a fine to be paid, and if so, then it decreases its 
nugget counter accordingly. 
After successful verification, SMq calculates the n w 
Packet Purse Header PPH ~. This is illustrated in Figure 5. 
It puts its own identifier i dsM q in the common part. It de- 
creases the number of nuggets in the packet by one, and 
constructs the purse part by including the identifier of the 
next security module SM~, the sending counter eq~r as- 
sociated with SMr, the number of nuggets in the packet, 
the fine counter fq,r associated with the next hop, and the 
Purse Authentication Code PACq,r calculated from the 
purse and the ash value of the content of the packet us- 
ing the cryptographic hash function 9 and the shared se- 
cret kq,~. Then SMq increases its sending counter Cq..+~, 
and constructs the acknowledgement part by including the 
identifier of SMp, the sending counter Cp~q form the purse 
part of PPH, and the Acknowledgement Authentication 
Code AACq,p, which is calculated from PPH using the 
cryptographic hash function 9 and the shared secret kq,p. 
Finally, SMq stores PPH ~ internally, and outputs a copy 
for Tq. 
Tq attaches the new Packet Purse Header PPH ~ to the 
packet and sends it to Tr. Tp also receives the forwarded 
message, and it can recognize that there is an acknowl- 
edgement for its security module SMp in the packet, be- 
cause PPH ~ contains the identifier of SMp in the ac- 
knowledgement part. Tp uploads PPH ~ to its security 
module. SMp tries to find PPH in its internal mem- 
ory by matching the identifier of SMq and the sending 
counter eceived in the acknowledgement part of PPH' 
to the identifiers and sending counters in the purse part of 
stored pending Packet Purse Headers. If SMp finds PPH, 
then it verifies the authenticity ofthe acknowledgement in 
PPH ~ by re-computing the Acknowledgement Authenti- 
cation Code from PPH and comparing it to the value re- 
ceived in PPH ~. If they are equal, then SMp increases its 
nugget counter by one, decreases its fine counter fp,q by 
the the value of the fine in PPH (but never lets it become 
less than 0), and eletes PPH from its internal memory. 
Tp keeps track of the forwarded but not yet acknowl- 
edged packets. If no acknowledgement arrives to a packet 
after a given time, then Tp notifies its security module, 
which increases the fine counter that is associated with 
the misbehaving neighbor and deletes the corresponding 
Packet Purse Header from its internal memory. Although 
it would be simpler if the security module itself measured 
the time-out, we do not want o require the s curity module 
to have an i ternal clock, because this would also require 
an internal source of energy, and we believe that building 
such a tamper resistant module is quite difficult. Our solu- 
tion still works well, because Tp is not interested in signal- 
ing a missing acknowledgement if the acknowledgement 
has indeed arrived: it can increase its number of nuggets 
by uploading the acknowledgement, while it cannot gain 
anything by claiming it missing. 
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B.3 Packet creation and final delivery 
Before the packet is sent by its originator, the secu- 
rity module decreases its nugget counter by the number of 
nuggets pecified by the originator and creates a PPH that 
contains the same number of nuggets. This PPH is a spe- 
cial one, because it does not have any acknowledgement 
part, since there is no previous hop that would need it. 
When the packet is delivered to its final destination, then 
the PPH is loaded in the security module, which creates a
special PPH' that has only an acknowledgement part. The 
destination should send an empty packet with this special 
PPH' to the previous hop. If it does not send it, then the se- 
curity module of the previous hop increases its fine counter 
associated with the destination, and the destination will be 
punished for the misbehavior later. 
C. Implementing the Packet Trade Model 
The Packet Trade Model can be implemented in the 
same way as the Packet Purse Model. Like before, each 
packet has an additional header, which we call Packet 
Trade Header (PTH). The structure of the PTH is the same 
as the structure of the PPH, with the only difference that 
instead of the number of nuggets, it contains the price 
of the packet. The same packet forwarding protocol de- 
scribed before applies in the Packet Trade Model as well 
with a minor modification. Now, the security module of 
each forwarding terminode decreases its nugget counter by 
the price in the PTH (buying) and increases the price by 
one when re-computing the PTH, and increases its nugget 
counter by the new price when the acknowledgement ar-
rives (selling). 
V. ANALYSIS 
In this section, we shortly analyze the implementation 
of  the Packet Purse Model described above. We show how 
the implementation s lves our original problems of stimu- 
lation for co-operation and prevention of overloading, and 
discuss its robustness and efficiency. Essentially, this anal- 
ysis applies for the implementation of the Packet Trade 
Model as well, since it is almost identical to the implemen- 
tation of the Packet Purse Model. We will point out those 
cases in which the analysis does not apply for the Packet 
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Trade Model. 
A. Stimulation for co-operation and prevention of over- 
loading 
Our implementation e courages users to keep their ter- 
minodes switched on and let them forward packets, be- 
cause this is the only way to increase their number of 
nuggets. If a terminode does not forward a packet, then 
it will receive a fine later, and its number of nuggets will 
be decreased. In addition, if a terminode denies packet for- 
warding for a long time, then no more packet will be sent 
to it. 
Our implementation f the Packet Purse Model discour- 
ages users to send useless traffic and overload the network 
because this would decrease their number of nuggets. Our 
solution ensures that the benefit each user. gets from the 
network does not exceed what she contributes to it. 
We should note, however, that our implementation f
the Packet Trade Model does not deter users from over- 
loading the network. The reason is that, contrary to the 
original idea of the Packet Trade Model, our implementa- 
tion does not allow a terminode to decide whether it buys 
a packet or not. Instead, a terminode is forced to buy each 
packet hat is sent to it. This means that any terminode can 
generate useless traffic and overload the network without 
any consequences. In order to solve this problem, our im- 
plementation must be modified to allow each terminode to 
decide whether to buy a packet or not. This would provide 
a sort of "back pressure" mechanism, which may ensure 
that eventually nobody will buy packets from misbehaving 
senders. This issue is left for further study. 
B. Robustness 
The implementation described above is robust and re- 
sists against various attacks. Nugget forgery is prevented, 
because it would require either an illegitimate increase of 
the nugget counter, or the generation of fake packet purses 
or acknowledgements. The former is impossible, because 
the nugget counter is manipulated by the security module, 
which functions correctly and its behavior cannot be al- 
tered. The latter is prevented by the use of cryptographic 
checksums (i.e., the Purse Authentication Code and the 
Acknowledgement Authentication Code), which can be 
computed correctly only by the security module. These 
checksums also protect he integrity of the PPH during 
transit. Furthermore, the packet purse cannot be detached 
from the packet and re-used with another one, because the 
calculation of the Purse Authentication Code involves the 
cryptographic hash value of the content of the packet. Re- 
play of the packet purse is prevented by the use of an ever 
increasing counter that is placed in the purse. This solution 
is preferable to the application of time-stamps, because it
does not require the security module to have an internal 
clock and to run clock synchronization protocols, which 
would need to be secured as well. 
The originator of a packet cannot re-use the nuggets that 
it has already loaded in the packet, because the security 
module decreases the nugget counter when creating a PPH 
for a new packet. An intermediary cannot ake out more 
nuggets from the packet than it deserves for the packet for- 
warding, because its nugget counter can be manipulated 
exclusively by its security module, which behaves cor- 
rectly. Moreover, the intermediary is stimulated to f rward 
the packet, because its nugget counter will be increased 
only if an acknowledgment arrives from the next hop, and 
this is possible only if the packet has been forwarded. 
Our solution requires each hop to send an acknowledge- 
ment for the packet it received. Terminodes, however, may 
be reluctant to send acknowledgements, because sending 
consumes energy and it does not have any direct advan- 
tages. This problem is related to fair exchange [6], [7] (in 
our case, packets for acknowledgements), and it is usually 
solved with the involvement of a trusted third party (TFP). 
We cannot, however, assume the existence of TTPs in ter- 
minode networks. The problem of fair exchange without a 
TTP is analyzed in [8], where it is called unenforced safe 
exchange. The author proves that isolated unenforced safe 
exchange isnot possible if the last step of the exchange has 
some costs. A proposed solution is that one should not con- 
sider only a single isolated exchange, but one should also 
take into account possible future exchanges, where the be- 
havior of the parties in the future exchanges may depend 
on the result of the current exchange. If misbehavior in 
the present can be punished in the future, then unenforced 
safe exchange becomes possible. In our implementation, 
we used these ideas in two ways to stimulate terminodes 
to send acknowledgments. First, we reduced the cost of 
sending an acknowledgement by piggy backing it to a nor- 
mal packet hat the terminode sends anyway (except for 
the destination of a packet). Second, we introduced fines," 
in order to punish misbehaving terminodes. Moreover, the 
fine is sent in the purse together with the nuggets, which 
enforces the terminode who wants the nuggets to upload 
the fine as well to the security module, which will decrease 
the nugget counter according to the received fine. 
We should note that exchanges without TTP can never 
achieve the same level of fairness as those with TFP. 
The existence of different levels of fairness is discussed 
in [9], where the authors relate the different levels to 
different equilibrium concepts in game theory. Accord- 
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ing to these results, our implementation achieves Nash- 
equilibrium fairness, which essentially means that a mis- 
behaving party may cause some damage to a correctly be- 
having one, but it also loses something or at least cannot 
gain anything (apart from alicious joy) with the misbe- 
havior. 
C. Efficiency 
At first sight, our solution may seem a bit heavy to im- 
plement. However, the overhead generated by it is small 
when compared to all the functions that are required to ac- 
complish packet forwarding. In particular, the calculation 
and verification of the Packet Purse and the Packet Trade 
Headers require only cryptographic hash function compu- 
tations, which can be done very efficiently [10]. Public key 
cryptographic operations are used only rarely (in the hello 
protocol). Moreover, most of the processing load will be 
supported by the security module; to some extent, it can be 
accomplished in parallel with the processing performed by 
the main processor of the terminode. 
Another issue is the length of the Packet Purse Header. 
Assuming that the identifiers of the security modules are 
8 byte long, the sending and receiving counters are 6 byte 
long, the Purse and the Acknowledgement Authentication 
Codes are 20 byte long, and the nuggets and the fine are 
both represented on 2 bytes, we get that the Packet Purse 
Header is 80 byte long. We cannot further assess whether 
this is acceptable ortoo much, because of the lack of infor- 
mation about the length of other headers and the average 
length of the packets. 
Efficiency can be improved by using the Packet Purse 
Header and all the related mechanisms only in a small frac- 
tion of packets. Then the majority of the packets would not 
carry an additional header and would be processed without 
any call to the security module. This means, however, that 
the terminodes would not be rewarded for the forwarding 
of each packet, and we would have to ensure that they for- 
ward those packets as well from which they cannot expect 
any nuggets. This issue is left for future work. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we addressed the problem of service avail- 
ability in terminode networks (mobile ad-hoc WANs). We 
have presented a secure mechanism to stimulate nd users 
to keep their terminodes turned on, to refrain from over- 
loading the network, and to thwart ampering aimed at con- 
verting the device into a "selfish" one. 
Although, in this paper, we presented our ideas in the 
context of the Terminodes Project, we believe that our re- 
sults are more widely applicable, and can be combined 
with current routing protocols for ad-hoc networks. 
This work was motivated by the experience of cellular 
networks, which has proven that as soon as mobile stations 
are under the control of end users, there is a strong temp- 
tation to alter their behavior in one way or another. There- 
fore, all facets of security have to be carefully analyzed and 
• implemented. We are currently working on the integration 
of the proposed solution with other security functions, such 
as confidentiafity and integrity protection of communica- 
tions. 
Finally, we believe that introducing a kind of virtual cur- 
rency can serve several other purposes in mobile ad-hoc 
WANs. First, it can be used to remunerate not only com- 
munication services, as described in this paper, but also 
information services. Second, it can be used as a way to 
pay for the usage of backbones or satellite links, when a 
terminode has to communicate with a very distant party. 
In this case, the virtual currency will have to be converted 
in some way into "hard" currency. 
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